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By assuming that the probability of
default increases with the debtservice burden, it is shown that the
se t of ad m issib le reschedu ling
schem es of a sovereign debt to a
private creditor can be depicted by a
U -sh aped curve in the plane
spanned by the renegotiated annual
debt
rep ay m en t
an d
the
re n e g o tia te d
le n g th
of
th e
repayment period. By classifying
creditors and debtors by risk and
time preference, the choice of a
rescheduling scheme from this set
and the likelihood of agreement is
analysed for eighty-one possible
co m b in atio n s of cred itors and
debtors (JEL F34)

A preliminary draft of this paper was presented in the Eleventh Economic
Theory Workshop hosted by The Flinders University of South Australia,
Adelaide, February 1993.

I INTRODUCTION
Unlike a private debt, a sovereign debt is not subject to the
laws of bankruptcy or to the enforcement of collateral. Thus,
when the potential penalties on default are not substantial, a
rise in a country's level of indebtedness reduces that country's
inclination to service its external liabilities. It is possible,
however, that the probability of unilateral repudiation is
moderated by a country's concern about the adverse effect of a
default on its trustworthy reputation and, subsequently, on its
access to foreign loans (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Kletzer,
1984; Grossman and Van Huyck, 1988; and Levy, 1992) and by a
threat of direct sanctions (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989).
In view of the developing countries' high level of
indebtedness, it has been argued by Krugman (1988) that a
country's financial obligations act like a high marginal tax rate
which deters governments from taking painful measures to
improve a country's economic performance and discourages
capital formation. Thus, when an indebted country is on the
downward sloping side of the 'debt relief Laffer curve', both
debtor and creditor can benefit from a debt-reduction. Kenen
(1990) and Sachs (1990) have asserted that the external debt's
overhang is a primary cause for economic slow-down for
many of the developing countries and have recommended the
establishment of an international institution for organising
debt relief and debt-rescheduling negotiations between private
creditors and indebted countries. In contrast, Bulow and Rogoff
(1990) have argued that the external debt problem is a
symptom of poor economic management and growth, that the
presence of official creditors in debt negotiations ossifies the
bargaining position of private creditors, and that efficiency
would be best served by having less official involvement.

As argued in Krugman (1989), the basic approach for solving
the developing countries' debt problem is rescheduling and
concerted lending. The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to
identify the set of sovereign-debt rescheduling schemes which
are admissable for both creditor and debtor for negotiation; and
second, to analyse the creditor's and debtor's risk and tim e
preference over the feasible set and to assess the prospects for
agreement. Assuming that a country's inclination to repay its
liabilities decreases with its debt burden, but that the costs of
repudiation are substantial, and recognising that short-term
illiquidity does not necessarily lead to long-term insolvency,
this paper analyses the set of debt-rescheduling schemes which
are admissible for both the debtor and the creditor. It is shown
that this set can be depicted by a U-shaped curve in the plane
spanned by the renegotiated annual debt repayment and period
of repayment. The location of the preferred rescheduling
scheme on this curve is identified for eighty-one possible
com binations of creditors and debtors classified by their
attitude toward risk and rate of time preference.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II analyses
the probability of default and the expected annual debt
repayment and constructs the debt Laffer curve. Section III
presents the debt repayment constraint and constructs the
admissible rescheduling curve. Section IV describes the effects
of risk and time preference on the creditor's and debtor's
choices of an adm issible rescheduling scheme. Section V
presents the possible combinations of creditors and debtors and
indicates the likelihood of agreement between them about a
rescheduling scheme. The degree of sim ilarity between the
creditor's choice and the debtor's choice is discussed further in
the concluding remarks in section VI.

IL PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT, EXPECTED ANNUAL DEBT
REPAYMENT AND THE DEBT LAFFER CURVE
Consider a situation in which a sovereign country is liable to a
single private creditor, or to a well-coordinated syndicate of
private creditors, and cannot service its external liabilities in
accordance with the originally contracted terms, and in which
both the indebted country and its creditor have a sufficient
incentive for rescheduling the country's liabilities over a Tyear period in equal (in constant prices) annual repayments of
principal and interest. Dealing with a sovereign country whose
asset holdings abroad are negligible, the creditor is aware of the
fact that her control over the rescheduled repayment is
limited. Nevertheless, assume that the probability of default
perceived by the creditor is smaller than one due to substantial
costs that can be inflicted directly by retaliatory sanctions, such
as a ban on trade and credit, and indirectly through a loss of
trustworthy reputation. Assume further that the perceived
probability of default: 1. rises with the burden of servicing the
debt, m easured by the ratio of the ren eg otiated annual
repayment to the indebted country's level of gross national
product (GNP), as public pressure against tax-increase and
subsidy-cuts mounts; and 2. decreases with the creditor's ability
to retaliate by limiting the country's access to the international
credit market proportionately to the creditor's market share.
These assum ptions are incorporated into the following
linear expression:
p = a(M /Y) - As
where

(1)

p =
M =
Y
s

=
=

a

=

A, =

the probability of default,
a constant renegotiated annual repaym ent of
principal and interest in constant prices,
the indebted country's GNP in constant prices,
the creditor's share in the international credit
market,
a positive scalar indicating the marginal effect of the
debt burden on the country's inclination to default,1
and
a positive scalar indicating the deterrent effect of the
creditor's power in the international credit market.

In accordance with the debt-overhang h y p oth esis, assume
that the indebted country's investment is adversely affected by
the annual debt repaym ents through a decline in the
government budget for investment and through an (expected
and actual) increase in tax rates, which, in the presence of
capital mobility, discourages capital formation and repatriation
of flight capital (Krugman, 1989; Helpman, 1989; Dooley and
Helpman, 1992; and Boyce, 1992).2 Since the country's GNP is
directly related to investment, this assumption implies that
the indebted country's GNP is adversely affected by the annual
debt repayment as indicated, for convenience, by the following
linear equation:

Y = Y - 5 M , 8>1

(2)

1

Following Berg and Sachs (1988), it can be argued that a is affected
by the indebted country's social, political and economic structure.

2

For tests of the debt-overhang hypothesis see Levy, Chowdhury
and Wilson (1991), Cohen (1993) and Levy and Chowdhury (1993).

where Y is the highest level of GNP attainable had the annual
debt-repayments been nil, and 8 is a positive scalar indicating
the potentially adverse marginal effect of the renegotiated
annual debt-repayment on the country's GNP. Equation 2 also
indicates that the renegotiated debt-repayment cannot exceed
Y /d
The substitution of equation 2 into equation 1 for Y implies
that the probability of default perceived by the creditor is given
by
p = a[M / (Y-8M)] - Xs

(3)

which, by differentiation, indicates that

_

ocY

> 0

(4)

PM ~ ( Y - 8M)2
and

Pmm “

28aY
_ , > 0.
(Y - 5M)3

(5)

Obviously, the creditor requires that 0 < p < 1. Since p rises
with M, this requirement implies that the renegotiated annual
debt repayment lies within the interval M min < M < Mmax,
where p(Mnun) = 0 and p(M max) = 1- The substitution of these
boundary conditions into equation 3 yields:

(6)

and
J

J______
l^a + 8(1+Xs) J

Note that since a > 0, M max < Y/ 8. Note further that the feasible
interval Mmax - Mmin is rightwardly shifted by larger values of
Y and Xs and by smaller values of a and 8. This interval is also
enlarged by higher values ofY.
In view of the above arguments, the annual debt-repayment
(ADR) is perceived by the creditor to be distributed as follows:
f M l-aM /<y-8M) + Xs
ADR = 1
_
[ 0 <xM/(Y-8M)-Xs.3

(8)

Consequently, the expected annual debt repayment (EADR) is:

EADR = [1 - cxM/(Y - 8M) + As]M

(9)

and by differentiation

= 1'

3

+ Pm ^M^

| 0 as M = M

(10)

The nature of the analysis will not be substantially changed by
replacing the assumption of a complete default by a partial
default, i.e., an actual annual repayment of gM dollars (0 < g < 1)
with probability p.

where
M

a
- W

Y

a + 5 (l+ A s ).

(11)

Intuitively, an increase in the renegotiated annual debt
repayment reduces the probability of payment each year and,
hence, the expected annual debt repayment is subject to a ' debt
Laffer curve'. That is, beyond the critical level M an increase in
the payment due causes the probability of default to go up so
much that expected payment falls. Thus, EADR rises and then
falls with M as illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1

The debt Laffer curve

ffl.

DEBT REPAYMENT CONSTRAINT AND THE
ADMISSIBLE RESCHEDULING CURVE

Suppose that the distribution of the actual annual debtrepayment is perceived by the creditor to be stable over the
repayment period.4 In view of equation 9, the present value
(PV) of the stream of the expected annual debt-repayments
(SEADR) over a T-year period is given by:
T
PV(SEADR) = S [l-aM /(Y -8M )+te]M /(l+r)‘
t=0
= [l-cxM/(y-8M)+Xs]M[p(l-pT)/(i-p)]

(12)

where
p = 1/(1+r)

(13)

and r is a constant, real, interest rate per annum.
Suppose that equation 3 and the values of its right-handside variables and coefficients are com m on kn ow led g e in the
sense that the debtor knows that the creditor uses equation 3
and relevant data and that the creditor knows that she (the
debtor) uses the same equation and data in assessing the
probability of default, and vice versa, and that the creditor is
aware of the possibility that, due to a domestic pressure, the
sovereign might not always be able to raise taxes and reduce
other spending (e.g., subsidies) for servicing the country's

4

Alternatively, one may incorporate, for example, an anticipation
of economic growth, or economic slowdown, into the analysis by
multiplying (Y - dM) by a shift factor gt, where g is a positive
scalar equal to one plus the anticipated growth rate.

external liabilities. Suppose further that the creditor's profits
from retaliation are small and that the creditor believes that
the sovereign is reliable in the sense that a short-term, or
current, illiquidity does not necessarily lead to a long-term
insolvency. In which case, the creditor prefers to tolerate the
uncertainty about future repayments and negotiates new debtrepayment's terms which implicitly incorporate episodes of
temporary illiquidity. In this setting, and in view of equation
12, it is suggested that the rescheduling schemes (M,T) which
are admissible for negotiation by both the creditor and debtor
should obey the following debt-repaym ent constraint:

[1 - aM/(?-8M)+Xs]M[p(l-pT)/(l-p)] = D 0

(14)

where Do denotes the country's external debt, after discount, at
the beginning of the planning horizon. This constraint can be
equivalently rendered as

T = {log{p-(l-p)Do/[l-cxM/(y-5M)+Xs]M}/log|3} -1 .

(15)

The set of all the admissible rescheduling schemes can be
depicted by a curve in the M-T plane, which is referred to
hereafter as the adm issible rescheduling curve. By totally
differentiating equation 14 and by recalling that the probability
of default rises with M, it can be shown that along the
admissible rescheduling curve of a sovereign debt the period of
repayment is initially shortened but later lengthened as the
renegotiated annual repayment rises.

PR O PO SITIO N : Along the admissible rescheduling curve

< 0 for Mmin < M< M
dM

= 0 for

M=M

> 0 for

M <M<M max.

(!6 )

The proof of this proposition is given in the Appendix.
Intuitively, note that 1-(3T rises as T rises. Hence, EADR must
fall as T rises to satisfy the debt repayment constraint 14. This
requires M initially to fall and then to rise as T rises. If M is
small, the Laffer curve is upward sloping. Thus, for sm all
values of M , a higher M means a higher EADR and
subsequently shorter period of repaying Do- At some point,
however, EADR begins to fall as M continues to rise. At this
point, T must be raised to maintain Do constant as M rises.
Figure 2 illustrates the above-mentioned proposition by
displaying the set of all the rescheduling schemes which are
admissible for negotiation by both the debtor and the creditor,

Q = {(M,T)e $(.+: [l-aM/(Y-5M)+As]M[p(l-pT)/(i.p)]=Do}/ as a
U-shaped curve in the plane spanned by M and T.5 Equation 14
indicates further that an increase in the d ebtor's initial
liabilities and an increase in the international interest rate shift

5

If the assumption of common knowledge is replaced by asymetric
information, it is likely that the debtor would claim that the
probability of default is lower than that perceived by the
creditor, for any given annual debt repayment, in order to obtain a
repayment period shorter than that required by the creditor. In
which case, the admissible rescheduling curve considered by the
debtor lies below the rescheduling curve considered by the creditor.

the adm issible rescheduling curve upward, whereas an
increase in the country's potential GNP level and an increase
in the creditor's m arket share in the international credit
market shift the curve downward by reducing the probability
of default.

Figure 2. The admissible rescheduling curve

IV.

RISK , TIM E PREFERENCE AND THE CREDITOR'S AND
DEBTOR'S CHOICES

The adm issible rescheduling curve developed above is the
locus of all combinations of M and T yielding a constant sum
of discounted expected annual repayments which is equal to
the remaining external debt after an initial and predetermined
discount. Attitude toward risk and time preference, which may

affect the creditor's and debtor's choice of a rescheduling
scheme, are not included in the construction of this curve.
These factors are considered now to identify the preferred
adm issible rescheduling schemes by the creditor and the
debtor.
From the creditor's perspective there is a trade-off between
risk of nonpayment and impatience along the downwardsloping side of the rescheduling curve. That is, the costs of a
shorter period of debt repayment is the increase in the level of
risk bearing as the recontracted annual payment rises. If the
creditor's decision was not affected by time preference, a riskaverse creditor would prefer rescheduling scheme A over any
other scheme, regardless of her intensity of risk aversion, in
order to minimise the variance of the total repayment for the
given am ount of expected total repaym ent. H ow ever,
impatience shifts the creditor's choice downward along the
admissible rescheduling curve toward C. Schemes along the
upward-sloping side of the curve may be considered by the
creditor if she is either risk neutral or risk lover. In general, the
creditor's choice of an adm issible rescheduling schem e is
indicated by one of the nine possible cells defined by attitude
toward risk and time preference and displayed by Table 1. The
schemes chosen by the nine types of creditors are indicated on
the admissible rescheduling curve in Figure 2 by A, B, C, D, E, F
and G .

Table 1

The creditor's choice of an admissible rescheduling
scheme
Attitude toward risk o f nonpayment
Aversion

Neutrality

Love

Strong
(Impatience)

C

D

E

Average

B

D

F

Weak
(Patience)

A

5!
I

ta,
.5
f-.

A or G

G

Similarly, from the debtor's point of view there is a trade-off
between risking current domestic stability and altruism toward
future generations along the downward-sloping side of the
admissible rescheduling curve. That is, the costs of alleviating
the current burden of the external debt by negotiating a small
annual repayment and avoiding painful measures that might
lead to social and political instability is the foregone
consumption of future generations imposed by spreading the
debt repaym ent over a long period. Schemes along the
upward-sloping side of the curve may be considered by the
indebted sovereign if she is either risk neutral or risk lover
and ready to face the social unrest and the political risk
stemming from a large annual repayment and believes that
the high dom estic pressure would lead to frequent and
excusable nonpayment. In general, the choice of an admissible
rescheduling scheme falls into one of the nine categories

defined by the sovereign's attitude toward risk and time
preference as displayed in Table 2. For sim plicity, the
rescheduling schemes chosen by the nine types of debtors are
also illustrated by A, B, C, D, E, F and G on the adm issible
rescheduling curve in Figure 2. More generally, the chosen
schemes are rather likely to be in the vicinity of these points.
Table 2

The debtor's choice of an admissible rescheduling
scheme
Attitude toward risking domestic stability

V.

Aversion

Neutrality

Love

Strong
(myopia)

A

A orG

G

Average

B

C

F

Weak
(Altruism)

C

D

E

CREDITOR-DEBTOR COMBINATIONS OF AGREEMENT
AND DISAGREEMENT

The possible combinations of creditors and debtors, their
choices and the degree of similarity or difference between their
choices are summarised by Table 3. In each cell of this table, the
upper entry indicates the creditor's choice and the lower the

debtor's choice. The degree of similarity between these choices
is indicated by = in the case of consensus, = in the case of a
strong similarity, ~ in the case of a weak similarity, * in the
case of a substantial difference, and # in the case of a large
difference. The combinations of creditor and debtor yielding
consensus or similarity are further highlighted by shading.
These combinations are located in the top-left, bottom-right,
centre and centre-left regions of the table in which there is, in
most cases, a similarity between the creditor's and debtor's
attitude toward risk. In contrast, strong disagreement exists
when one of the sides is risk averse while the other is risk
lover as their choices lie on opposite sides of the admissible
rescheduling curve and the debt Laffer curve.

Combinations of types of creditors and debtors and
their choices

cc
o

Risk Averse/
Altruist
Risk Neutral/
Myopic

1—
Risk Neutral/
Average

CQ
Ul

Cl

D

I
Q)

C
\

1 1 *1 1

m m
w
8

B
B

1 * 1
■: 00
8

C

i i i l l
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1 *1 1 i i i i
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C
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CONCLUSION

This paper proposed that the set of admissible rescheduling
schemes of a sovereign debt can be depicted by a U-shaped
curve in the plane spanned by the renegotiated annual debt
repaym ent and the renegotiated repayment period. The
classification of creditors and debtors by risk and tim e
preference led to eighty-one distinct combinations. Consensus
and good prospects for quickly reaching an agreement may be
obtained in the following cases:
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk averse and if the creditor is
patient whereas the debtor is myopic, they would both prefer the
rescheduling scheme A with the smallest annual repayment and
the longest period of repayment.
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk averse and if the creditor is
impatient whereas the debtor is altruist, they would both prefer
the rescheduling scheme C.
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk averse and having average
rate of time preference, they would both prefer rescheduling
scheme B with a relatively small annual repayment over a long
period.
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk averse and if the creditor
has an average rate of time preference and the debtor is altruist,
they are likely to reach an agreement about a rescheduling scheme
between B and C with a relatively small annual repayment over a
considerably long period.
• If the debtor is risk averse and altruist and the creditor is risk
neutral and not very patient, or if the creditor is risk averse and
impatient and the debtor is risk neutral and altruist, they are
likely to reach an agreement about a rescheduling scheme between
C and D with a substantial annual repayment over a short period.

• If both the creditor and debtor are risk neutral and if the creditor is
not patient and the debtor is altruist, they would both prefer
scheme D with the shortest period of debt repayment and a
substantial annual repayment.
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk lover and if the creditor is
patient whereas the debtor is myopic, they would both prefer
scheme G with the largest annual repayment and a considerably
long repayment period.
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk lover and if the creditor is
impatient whereas the debtor is altruist, they would both prefer
scheme E with a substantial annual repayment over a relatively
short period.
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk lover and have an average
rate of time preference, they would both prefer scheme F with a
very large annual repayment over a substantially long period.
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk lover and the creditor is
patient (or has an average rate of time preference) whereas the
debtor has an average rate of time preference (or is myopic), they
are likely to reach an agreement on a scheme between F and G with
a high annual payment over a long period.
• If both the creditor and debtor are risk lover and the creditor is
impatient (or has an average rate of time preference) whereas the
debtor has an average rate of time preference (or is altruist), they
are likely to reach an agreement on a scheme between E and F with
a large annual payment over medium length period of repayment.

• If the creditor is risk neutral and not very patient and the debtor is
risk lover and altruist, they are likely to reach an agreement on a
scheme with a short repayment period and a substantially large
annual repayment between D and E. Such a rescheduling scheme is
also likely to be chosen if the debtor is risk neutral and altruist and
the creditor is risk lover and impatient.
• If the debtor is risk neutral and altruist and the creditor is risk
averse and impatient, they are likely to reach an agreement on a
scheme with a short repayment period and a substantial annual
repayment between C and D.
Finally, when it is unclear which of the extreme schemes A
and G is preferred by either the creditor, debtor, or both, there
is a scope for consensus, but there is also a possibility of strong
disagreem ent. The rest of the combinations reveal a high
degree of disagreem ent about an admissible rescheduling
scheme. In such cases, a substantial level of mediation is
required.

APPENDIX

Proof of the U-Shaped Admissible Rescheduling Curve's
Proposition
Equation 14 can be rewritten as
EADR(M)B(T) = D 0

(A.l)

where EADR(M) is explicitly given by equation 9 and
BCD = p(l-pT)/(l-p).

(A.2)

By totally differentiating equation A.l
dT
- 9EADR/3M
dM I Do = const. ”
3B /9T
‘

(A.3)

Since 9B/3T > 0,
.
fdT
]
f3EADR(M)l
Slgn {dM I D0 = const. J " ' Slgn {
9M
j

(A.4)

and in recalling equation 10,

dT
dM I Do = const.

< 0 for Mmin
= 0 for
> 0 for

M< M
M=M

M <M <M max l

(A.5)
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